Europe’s effort to secure its access to critical minerals has exposed a major strategic weakness: overwhelming dependence on China for rare earths. This vulnerability became unmistakably clear when China tightened export licensing for rare-earth magnets, cutting shipments by roughly 75 percent and forcing European automakers to halt production. The episode highlighted how deeply Europe’s industrial base, green transition, and advanced technologies depend on a fragile rare earths supply chain concentrated in a single country.
Rare earth elements are essential inputs for wind turbines, solar panels, electric vehicles, artificial intelligence hardware, electronics, and defence systems. While Europe’s demand for these materials is growing rapidly alongside renewable energy deployment, domestic production remains minimal. China currently produces about 95 percent of global rare-earth oxides and supplies roughly 70 percent of Europe’s imports, including nearly all of its rare-earth magnets as well as magnesium, gallium, and germanium used in semiconductors. This concentration gives Beijing significant leverage over European manufacturing and energy transitions, underscoring the strategic risks embedded in the current rare earths supply chain.
In response, the European Union has launched a suite of policies aimed at reducing foreign dependence. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act seeks to strengthen domestic extraction, processing, and recycling, while the Economic Security Doctrine and its ResourceEU plan frame critical minerals as a cornerstone of industrial sovereignty. These policies acknowledge that Europe cannot rapidly replace Chinese supply but can begin rebuilding capacity through targeted investment, regulatory reform, and supply diversification.
France plays a central role in near-term mitigation through processing and recycling. The Belgian-French company Solvay operates one of only two rare-earth processing facilities in Europe and plans to expand production with government support. By recycling rare earths from end-of-life motors and equipment already in Europe, Solvay estimates it could eventually supply around 30 percent of regional demand. Recycling and processing offer the fastest way to ease immediate shortages and strengthen resilience within the rare earths supply chain, even though they cannot fully eliminate dependence on mined materials.
Longer-term solutions depend on new mining projects, particularly in Scandinavia. In Norway, Rare Earths Norway has identified what is believed to be Europe’s largest known rare-earth deposit at the Fen Carbonatite Complex, containing an estimated 8.8 million tonnes of rare-earth oxides. The company aims to begin production in the early 2030s and is promoting an “invisible mine” approach designed to reduce surface disruption and environmental impact. In Sweden, state-owned miner LKAB is developing a major rare-earth project near Kiruna, linked to the expansion of existing iron ore operations, though it involves significant social and economic trade-offs, including relocating residents.
Together, these developments offer cautious optimism. Expanded processing in France can alleviate short-term constraints, while Norwegian and Swedish mines may anchor future domestic supply. However, even under optimistic timelines, Europe will remain reliant on overseas sourcing from countries such as Canada, Australia, and Brazil for years to come. Achieving resilience will therefore require sustained investment, streamlined permitting, and international partnerships to gradually rebalance the rare earths supply chain away from single-country dominance and toward a more diversified, secure system.